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RECENT DECISIONS
weight and speed alone are liable to cause damage if defectively con-
structed. Responsibility for the breach of duty once rested on actual
knowledge of the defect on the part of the dealer or seller,4 but in
later cases it was decided that this knowledge may be imputed in a
great many cases, among them, when there is a duty to know and
also when a person of ordinary care and prudence under the same
or similar circumstances ought to have known.5
The doctrine as to automobile dealers may be summed up by
saying that a dealer in standard make cars is not required to dis-
mantle the car in order to be absolved, but the law imputes to such
dealers such knowledge of its condition as can be ascertained by the
use of ordinary care. The failure of the buyer to discover these de-
fects, such as defective brakes, is not an intervening cause as will
excuse the seller of liability.6 A dealer in second hand cars who
undertakes to overhaul and recondition used cars for subsequent use
by others has the same duty as a manufacturer to exercise reason-
able care as to the condition of the vehicle.1 This is not the duty
of an insurer, but merely one of using care to discover patent defects.8
kE. J. M.
CARRIERS-NEGLIGENCE-NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER ALIGHT-
ING FROM MOVING TRAIN.-Appellant sued to recover damages for
injuries sustained while a passenger on appellee's railroad. Appel-
lant alleges that while she was a passenger on appellee's daycoach
she was awakened in the early morning, when it was still dark, and
informed that her destination was the next stop. She proceeded to
the vestibule to alight, and found the gangplank up and the door
open. Thinking the train had stopped, she stepped off and was
thrown under the train, sustaining serious injuries. The negligence
alleged was the opening of the door and the raising of the gangplank,
without providing a guard, before the train came to a stop. Held,
judgment for defendant affirmed. Harzin v. Kenan, - Fla. -, 26
So. (2d) 688 (1946).
The court in reaching its decision considered the following
points: First, in order for liability to attach to the railroad it is
necessary that there be negligence on the part of the railroad or its
agents. For the negligence to be actionable there must be a causal
4 Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (1903).5 Wichert v. Wisconsin Central Ry., 142 Wis. 375, 125 N. W. 943 (1910);
Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855 (1928).
6 5 Am. Jua. 690 § 349.
7 Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash. (2d) 458, 139 P. (2d) 706
(1943).8 Eagan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F. (2d) 373 (1939).
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connection between the negligence and the injury.' If there was
negligence on the part of the appellant it would not have constituted
a bar to appellant's cause of action, because Florida recognizes the
doctrine of comparative negligence.2  Second, appellant's contention
that notice of destination, opening the door and raising the gang-
plank, while the train was still in motion, without providing a guard,
spelled out negligence on the part of the railroad. The court, in
answer to this, cited a Kentucky case which was directly in point
and held, "that it was not negligence to announce the station before
the train arrived and the opening of the doors did not constitute an
invitation to alight before the train came to a stop." 3 This case is
distinguishable from a case wherein a passenger was notified that
the next scheduled stop was his destination, the train was stopped
before reaching the destination (not a place used for the embarking
and disembarking of passengers), the gangplank was up and the
door opened. It being dark and foggy, the passenger supposing this
to be his station, alighted from the train and thereby was injured.
There it was decided that the railroad breached a duty it owed to
the passenger to inform him of this departure from its scheduled
itinerary and was held liable for its negligence. 4  Third, as to the
degree of care owed by a railroad company for the safety of its pass-
engers a railroad company is held to a high degree of care for the
safety of its passengers, but, this duty does not relieve the passenger
of exercising a reasonable degree of care for his own safety. The
passenger, in possession of his normal faculties, is expected to know
when the train is in motion.5 It does not appear in this case that
the train was operated in a negligent manner.
The application of existing law and the resulting opinion rep-
resent the majority rule, except that in jurisdictions where the doc-
trine of comparative negligence is not recognized, the appellant in
all probabilities would have been non-suited. In New York it has
been held that for a passenger to alight or to board a moving train
is negligence per se, and acts as a bar to recovery. 6 In a New York
case where the facts were similar to those in the main case, it was
held that, merely announcing the approach of the station and open-
ing the doors, is not an invitation to alight in the absence of a direc-
tion to alight by an agent or a servant of the railroad and no liability
would attach.7
I. G. & F. W. M.
1Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933);
Florida East Coast Ry. v. Wade, 53 Fla. 620, 43 So. 775 (1907).
2 Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Norton, 75 Fla. 597, 78 So. 982 (1918).
3 Gayle's Administrator v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 163 Ky. 459, 173
S. W. 1113 (1915).
4 Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Norton, 78 Fla. 597, 78 So. 982 (1918).5 Zelman v. Pennsylvania R. R., 93 N. J. L. 57, 107 Atl. 442 (1919);
Maerns v. Central R. R. of N. J., 163 N. Y. 108, 57 N. E. 292 (1900).6 Solomon v. Manhattan Ry., 103 N. Y. 437, 9 N. E. 430 (1886).
7 Maerns v. Central R. R. of N. J., 163 N. Y. 108, 57 N. E. 292 (1900).
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